## EXHIBIT D

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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

In Re: : Chapter 11

: Case No.

W.R. GRACE & CO., et al, : 01-01139 JKF

: (Jointly

Debtors : Administered)

Thursday, May 7, 2009

Oral deposition of GEORGE L.

PRIEST, taken pursuant to notice, was
held at the offices of DRINKER BIDDLE &

REATH, Two Logan Square, 18th & Cherry

Streets, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

19103, commencing at 10:18 a.m., on the
above date, before Lori A. Zabielski, a

Registered Professional Reporter and

Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania.

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1 2	INDDV		1	<b>~</b>
3	INDEX		2	(It is hereby stipulated and
4			3	agreed by and asset and
5	Testimony of: GEORGE L. PRIEST		1 .	agreed by and among counsel for
6	decked E. 1 kiesi		4	the respective parties that the
7	By Mr. Lockwood Page 09, 239		5	filing, sealing and certification
8	By Ms. Esayian Page 213		6	of the deposition are waived; and
9	By Mr. Brown Page 233		7	that all objections, except as to
10	By Mr. Pernicone Page 234		8	the form of the question, will be
11 12			9	reserved until the time of trial.)
13	EXHIBITS		10	and and diffic of tital.)
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15	NO. DESCRIPTION PAGE			(Exhibits Priest-1, 2, and 3
16	Priest-1 Exhibit Book to First		12	premarked for identification.)
ĺ	Amended Joint Plan of		13	
17	Reorganization and		14	GEORGE L. PRIEST, after
	Disclosure Statement as		15	having been first duly sworn, was
18	of February 27, 2009 09	•	16	examined and testified as follows:
19	Priest-2 Debtors' Disclosure		17	chammod and testified as 10110WS:
20	Statement for the First		18	TOXAL COLLA COVA
20	Amended Joint Plan of		1	EXAMINATION
21	Reorganization under	•	19	
21	Chapter 11 09	`	20	BY MR. LOCKWOOD:
	Priest-3 Certain Insurers' Notice		21	Q. Good morning, Professor
23	of Filing of the Expert		22	Priest.
رے	Report of Professor George L. Priest 09		23	
24	George L. Priest 09		1	A. Good morning.
			24	Q. You have been deposed

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review transcripts after depositions, but I just don't recall in terms of this transcript. I could find an answer for that in my office, but I don't know myself.

Q. So I take it, without wasting all of your and our time by reading through it, you have no particular recollection of the testimony that you gave that's embodied in that

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A. Well, not exactly. As you know, as I presume you know, I testified in a number of cases involving asbestos-related bankruptcies, and my testimony has been pretty much the same in all of them. So that I would be -- I can't imagine there is anything that's going to surprise me in this document. But I am surprised that I didn't put it in the list of testimony. That's the best I can tell you. I do not believe that the basic ideas are any different.

hadn't captured what you intended to say? And if you don't remember, that's the answer.

MR. BROWN: I believe he's already answered that, while he typically reviewed transcripts, he couldn't state that he reviewed this one.

MR. LOCKWOOD: I am pressing him on this one question to see if he remembers anything. If he doesn't, he doesn't.

THE WITNESS: I really don't recall any major change to a deposition transcript in recent times, but I can't precisely recall the Federal-Mogul deposition.

BY MR. LOCKWOOD:

Q. Okay. I am going to start then on your expert report here and get into some specifics, if that's okay.

Just to confirm some general aspects of this report, in paragraph 18

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specific about what I am trying to do here.

Q. Well, let me be more

The report that you rendered in the Federal-Mogul case, much of the first half or two-thirds of it, contains statements that are similar to or even identical to statements that are contained in your expert report in this case. I am just representing that to you. I am not asking you to agree or not.

And, in general, that's the portion of the report that discusses sort of the non-Grace-specific portions of what I will say the first half or so of this report.

And what I was wanting to ask you is whether or not you recalled reading that transcript at any point and saying to yourself that some answer that you gave to a question that was asked of you in that deposition was incorrect or materially incomplete or in some manner or another something that you felt that

in the very first sentence, your report states, quote, I have been asked to address the economic effects and implications of various features of the First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization, et cetera.

Is it correct then that your report is intended by you not to contain any of opinions on legal matters as opposed to economic matters?

A. Exactly. I have tried in the report to make clear that the opinion given here, presented here is an economic opinion based upon my understanding of custom and practice in the industry but is it not in any respect a legal opinion. And I hope throughout this deposition to continue to maintain that distinction.

Q. So despite the fact that you are a law professor and have a law degree, you are not utilizing or proffering that professional expertise as a basis for any legal views that might be deemed or considered or thought to be

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expressed in this report? A. Correct. I believe there are no legal opinions given here. I meant to write a report that was based on economics or custom and practice only.

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## Q. Just for the record, what is your economic training in the field of economics?

A. I attended the University of Chicago Law School. I took economics courses that were taught in the law school, and I also audited economic courses taught in the economics department. I have studied the field of economics extensively since then. That's the basic training.

But it's been reflected in publication and peer review economic journals. I serve as a peer reviewer for various economics journals. My title at Yale is Professor of Law and Economics. I don't teach in the economics department, but I have an economics background.

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## Q. But you don't have an advanced degree in the field of economics; is that correct?

Α. That's correct.

Q. And in paragraph 7 of your report, you say you have held appointments as a visiting professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Miami and the Department of Economics, University of Toronto.

Could you tell us what sort of professorships those were in -visiting professor, I take it, means that it wasn't a permanent employment. But, beyond that, in the Department of Economics, you were teaching law in economics or what were you doing in those capacities?

A. A visiting professor is basically someone brought in to teach a course, one or more courses, and I taught at the University of Miami in one of the subdivisions of the Department of Economics, courses on industrial

organization. I don't know if I taught an insurance course or not. I taught

2 3 there for two or three summers. And I

4 know there was an industrial organization

5 course, which was mostly economics, but I 6 did discuss some antitrust cases. But it 7 was mostly economics. I may have taught 8 a course on the economics of tort law --

I am not sure -- at Miami sometime ago.

In the Department of Economics of the University of Toronto, I taught a course on general principles of insurance with application to private insurance and governmental insurance. It was a course jointly listed in the Department of Economics and the law school.

Q. With respect to the subject of insurance, do you have any professional degrees or licenses or titles in that field?

A. No, I don't. It's simply been a subject of my study and research for a long period of my career.

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Q. Would it be fair to say that your involvement in the field of insurance has been either principally or exclusively -- and you tell us which -from the perspective of an academic role?

A. I would say yes with the -certainly, all of my -- I am an academic, and so all of my activities have been basically academic in nature. On the other hand, I have had, in my work in the insurance field, various assignments at one point or another that were more practical. And they were academic. though certainly I think my academic training and research and study was brought to bear on those tasks.

## Q. Well, just to be a little bit more specific, have you ever worked directly for an insurance company?

A. I have worked as a consultant for an insurance company. I have not worked as an employee in a W-2 sense for an insurance company.

Q. Have you worked, let's say,

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17 (Pages 62 to 65)

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paragraph 27 is meant to address primary insurers who have a right and duty to defend, because it includes the cause to perform these functions, which refers to the functions described in the previous sentence.

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Although, as you know, at later points in the report, I present this incentive point as it affects umbrella and excess carriers who typically would not have the right or duty to perform the functions that I am referring to in this paragraph.

Q. Well, I am trying to figure out -- and maybe you can help me with this -- which sentences in paragraph 27 are limited to the duties, rights, obligations of primary insurers and which ones are intended to cover the rights, obligations, duties of excess and umbrella insurers.

Because there is, certainly in the last sentence, a reference to excess policies, and I had trouble, refers to primary insurers who have a right and duty to defend. But the point about the superior position of an insurer that must ultimately pay the indemnity from its funds is a broader economic point. I then go on to apply that economic point more broadly.

Q. Okay. So keeping in mind that this expert report is being tendered in the W.R. Grace bankruptcy case as opposed to some sort of academic exercise, if, in fact, W.R. Grace was paying two-thirds of all indemnity costs out of its own pocket as of the date it entered bankruptcy, do any of two sentences that you just referred to, the third and fourth sentence of the paragraph 27, have any application whatsoever to W.R. Grace?

A. Sure, because it has application to W.R. Grace's policies. What I am trying to do in this Section is to explain the policies and the structure of the policies.

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reading this, to know where you were moving from describing primary coverage to either all coverage or excess coverage.

So could you look at that paragraph and see if there is a dividing line there?

A. No, there is not a dividing line, because, again, this is not a legal opinion and is not meant to address legal claims. It's trying to explain economic incentives and the economic structure.

So when I make the point about -- I start with a reference to the primary insurer that has a duty to defend claims. I then state that the insurer is in a superior -- this is to go on through the paragraph -- the insurer, and here I am referring to the primary insurer -- is in the superior position to perform these functions, meaning the functions of controlling the defense because it must ultimately pay the indemnity.

But that sentence itself

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If in fact W.R. Green was

If, in fact, W.R. Grace was able to enter agreements with its primary carriers to take over -- I don't know how it takes over two-thirds of the indemnity as opposed to all of it, or whatever; I don't know what those agreements are, and I will take your hypothetical -- that's great. The insurers agreed on some terms to shift -- to concede the right and duty to defend to Grace. That's fine. I am not against settlement in any regard.

But the incentive question is still applicable with regard, as you asked me before, with regard to those insurers who had not reached agreements with Grace. And so I think there is -- I think the paragraph, as it's written, is analytically applicable to some set of situations that we are trying to address here.

Q. So we are absolutely clear on this, W.R. Grace — let me rephrase this.

For the purpose of this

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20 (Pages 74 to 77)

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THE WITNESS: That's fine. That wouldn't affect my answer. BY MR. LOCKWOOD: Q. Similarly, with respect to paragraph 30 -- strike that.

You address a requirement of insurer consent to assignment of policy rights in paragraph 30 of your report, correct?

A. I do.

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- O. You are aware that the extent of which that right which on its face in the policy is asserted to be absolute is, in fact, the subject of varying state law decisions in jurisdictions over the circumstances under which assignments can be made by insureds without the consent of insurers, are you?
  - Α. Yes, I am aware of that.
- Q. So as to this paragraph, you are simply -- let me ask it this way: First, this paragraph is not intended by you to contain legal opinions about the

Requiring insurer consent to assignment ensures that the risks undertaken by the insurer under the policy not be increased by a policyholder's action without the insurer's consent.

Have I read that correctly?

A. Yes, you have.

- Q. What risks undertaken by the insurer under the policy are you referring to?
- A. The risks of paying out liability payments, the risk of paying indemnity.
- Q. So it's the risk to the insurer as opposed to the risk to the insured that you are discussing here?
- A. Exactly. It says that, the risks undertaken by the insurer, in the sentence you read.
- Q. Well, is it not true that one of the purposes of CGL liability policies is that the insured, in exchange for the payment of a premium, is getting the insurer to agree to, in effect,

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extent to which these provisions in CGL policies are or are not enforceable as a matter of state law; is that correct?

A. Absolutely.

Q. And, indeed, this discussion, as you have indicated earlier, has to do with your views as to the economic impact of the provision and the perceived need for it to be enforceable; is that correct?

A. I view the question of enforceability as a legal question. What I am trying to explain here is the economic basis for the assignment of responsibilities in the way that the policy assigns them.

So it's economic analysis, but I don't reach the question of what's enforceable and what isn't enforceable. That's a legal opinion. That would be calling for a legal opinion.

Q. Well, you have a sentence in here, the second sentence in paragraph 30 that talks about or states, quote,

assume the risks of the insured with respect to whatever activities are covered by that policy?

A. Yes.

Q. So, essentially, we have got two kinds of risks: We have got the risk to the insured that the insurer undertakes to cover; and we have got the risk to the insurer that the agreement to cover the first set of risks will cause the insurer to have to pay money.

Is that a fair breakdown of the risks?

A. No, I don't think it's fair. The first part -- I would say the first part of your sentence was fair. The risk, as I have it -- this is not exact, but the risk to the policy that had insurer has undertaken to cover. That's the risk I am talking about.

So it's a risk to the policy, although, which if it's covered, becomes a risk to the insurer. It's the same risk. It's not a different risk. I

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30 (Pages 114 to 117)

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Contracts Disputes in paragraph 38, I take it, notwithstanding that fact, that you are not in paragraph 38 testifying that as a matter of fact or insurance law the Grace Plan of Reorganization is collusion between Grace and the asbestos claimants representatives as that term is used in insurance law?

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A. I am not making a legal conclusion or drawing a legal conclusion at all.

I refer to this policyholder treatise because the prohibition of collusion between a policyholder and a claimant is not a specific term — it has to be inferred from an insurance policy. It is not a specific term of the insurance policy, but it has been inferred universally by courts.

But I am not rendering a legal conclusion or attempting to render a legal conclusion here. That's for the court to decide.

Q. Well, what is it about the

collusion in a legal sense is not for me to say. From an economic standpoint, that is contrary to the economic, what I—the point of this entire report is that's contrary to the economic structure established by Grace's insurance policies and other CGL policies.

Q. You said the involvement of the claimants with respect to the Plan in that answer. Do.

You really mean the creation of the Trust and the funding of the Trust with various types of insurance rights?

In other words, what I am driving at is the Plan itself has all kinds of provisions in it, many of which have nothing to do with asbestos. I am trying to ask you whether there is some, other than sort of the particular subparts that you referred to in your previous answer with respect to the TDPs — I am going to start over.

If the Plan didn't transfer insurance rights to the Trust, would it

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be your view that the creation of the

Trust by itself was evidence by collusion?

A. I am not quite sure what that means, but I would say, as I understand your question, the answer would be no.

Well, you know, I can't say.

What happens to the -- if it doesn't transfer the insurance proceeds, what happens to the insurance? If they make no claim against the insurance, then I would say the collusion point is no important. If it's simply a settlement between -- let's say Grace has released all of its insurers through some process and has now entered an agreement with the claimants against it, that's not collusive in the economic sense that I am using it here.

The concept of collusion that I am addressing, although not a legal concept, is the reference to the interest of the policyholder, aligning

Grace Reorganization Plan, if anything, that you regard from an economic point of view indicative of, quote, collusion, close quote?

A. Well, basically, the Debtor in the Grace Plan has agreed to a Plan which places substantial control of the Plan in the hands of claimants and representatives of the claimants.

The claimants or their representatives are in the first position to name the trustees. Its explicit representatives of the claimants indeed, not only representatives but fiduciary by the terms of the Plan, fiduciaries of the claimants are appointed to the Trust Advisory Committee and, of course, the Futures Representative is a fiduciary of future claimants.

So that is an agreement and a method of distributing the resources that has been agreed to between Grace and the claimants. That's what I mean.

Now, whether that's